

## **Towards systematizing and updating the definition and indicators for measuring the stability of governments: theoretical and methodological cut**

The article is dedicated to theoretical and methodological systematizing and updating the definition and indicators for measuring the stability of governments. The researcher examined theoretical, methodological and empirical results that variously describe the fullness and the essence of the concept of “government stability”. For this the author analyzed the essence of the notions of “government,” “governmental cabinet”, “cabinet of ministers” and “stability”. As a result, the researcher highlighted and systematized the indicators and measurement tools for analyzing stability of governments.

*Keywords:* government, governmental cabinet, cabinet of ministers, stability, duration, stability of governments.

## **ДО ОНОВЛЕННЯ Й СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЇ ДЕФІНІЦІЇ ТА ІНДИКАТОРІВ ВИМІРЮВАННЯ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ УРЯДІВ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ РОЗРІЗ**

Стаття присвячена теоретико-методологічному оновленню та систематизації дефініції й індикаторів вимірювання стабільності урядів. Дослідник розглянув теоретико-методологічні та емпіричні напрацювань, які по-різному описують наповненість і суть поняття «стабільність урядів». Для цього проаналізовано сутність понять «уряд», «урядовий кабінет», «кабінет міністрів» і «стабільність». Виділено і систематизовано індикатори й інструменти вимірювання стабільності урядів.

*Ключові слова:* уряд, урядовий кабінет, кабінет міністрів, стабільність, тривалість, стабільність урядів.

Government stability is a relatively “new” concept in comparative political studies. However, it has come into the focus of numerous study cases, elaborated by scholars from various national schools of political science. In its turn, this causes a number of positive (in particular diversification of research), as well as negative (segmentation and non-unified character of research) consequences. Therefore, overcoming and combining, especially on the basis of updating and systematization of definitions and indicators for measuring the stability of governments

(interchangeably – government stability) is quite an urgent task for comparative researchers and thus it determines topicality and relevance of the corresponding study.

This outlined range of problems is mainly grounded or at least is derivative from the current works by such scientists as D. Baron<sup>1</sup>, J. Blondel<sup>2</sup>, E. Damgaard<sup>3</sup>, L. DeWinter<sup>4</sup>, L. Dodd<sup>5</sup>, J. Druckman<sup>6</sup>, L. Frischtak<sup>7</sup>, Grofman and P. van Roosendaal<sup>8</sup>, I. Indridason and C. Kam<sup>9</sup>, G. King<sup>10</sup>, M. Laver, N. Schofield and K. Shepsle<sup>11</sup>, A. Lijphart<sup>12</sup>, G. Luebbert<sup>13</sup>, V. Lytvyn<sup>14</sup>, C. Nikolenyi<sup>15</sup>, D. Sanders and V. Herman<sup>16</sup>, K. Strøm<sup>17</sup>, A. Swaan<sup>18</sup>, M. Taylor and V. Hermann<sup>19</sup>, J. Toole<sup>20</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>21</sup>, E. Zimmerman<sup>22</sup> and many others.

Analysis of the works allows us conclude that in modern political science there is a number of theoretical-methodological and empirical studies which in different ways disclose essence and fullness of the concept “government stability”. In particular, some works examine such structural elements of governments, which compose a theoretical-methodological foundation

- <sup>1</sup> D. Baron, *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems*, „American Political Science Review“ 1991, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 137-164.
- <sup>2</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science“ 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180-203.
- <sup>3</sup> E. Damgaard, *Cabinet Termination*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Muller, T. Bergman (eds), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Style in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.
- <sup>4</sup> L. DeWinter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Doring (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115-151.
- <sup>5</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.
- <sup>6</sup> J. Druckman, *Party Factionalism and Cabinet Durability*, „Party Politics“ 1996, vol 3, s. 397-407.; J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 2002, vol 46, s. 760-771.
- <sup>7</sup> L. Frischtak, *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*, „World Bank Technical Paper“ 1994, vol 254.
- <sup>8</sup> B. Grofman, P. van Roosendaal, *Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.; P. van Roosendaal, *Government Survival in Western Multi-Party Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1997, vol 32, s. 71-92.
- <sup>9</sup> I. Indridason, C. Kam, *Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 621-656.
- <sup>10</sup> G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.
- <sup>11</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.; M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.
- <sup>12</sup> A. Lijphart, *Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.
- <sup>13</sup> G. Luebbert, *A Theory of Government Formation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 229-264.
- <sup>14</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist“*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriya: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia“ 2008, vol 10, s. 37-42.; V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.; V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist: teoretyko-metodolohichni zasady doslidzhenia*, „Ukrainska natsionalna ideia: realii ta perspektyvy rozvytku“ 2009, vol 21, s. 117-121.
- <sup>15</sup> C. Nikolenyi, *Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe*, „Party Politics“ 2004, vol 10, s. 123-150.
- <sup>16</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.
- <sup>17</sup> K. Strøm, *Contending Models of Cabinet Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 82, s. 923-941.; K. Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.
- <sup>18</sup> A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.
- <sup>19</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 64, s. 28-37.
- <sup>20</sup> J. Toole, *Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe*, „Party Politics“ 2000, vol 6, s. 441-461.
- <sup>21</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.; P. Warwick, *The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1979, vol 11, s. 465-498.
- <sup>22</sup> E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

for the so-called “structural approach” to the analysis of government stability (L. Dodd<sup>23</sup>, C. Nikolenyi<sup>24</sup>, K. Strom<sup>25</sup>, P. Roosendaal<sup>26</sup> and P. Warwick<sup>27</sup> and others). Other researchers analyze influence of institutional parameters of political systems on governmental stability, what makes the basis for the so-called “institutionalized approach” (J. Blondel<sup>28</sup>, J. Druckman<sup>29</sup>, D. Sanders and V. Herman<sup>30</sup>, M. Taylor<sup>31</sup>, J. Toole<sup>32</sup> and others). Other works combine the impact of unforeseen events on governmental stability and are actualized within the so-called “external approach” (K. Strom<sup>33</sup>, J. Druckman and M. Thies<sup>34</sup>, G. King<sup>35</sup>, G. Luebbert<sup>36</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>37</sup> and others). Besides, recently there have been conducted many attempts to combine the above-mentioned approaches, taking into account the influence of some ministers on the stability of governments (V. Lytvyn<sup>38</sup>), what provides the basis for constructing an “internal” approach, which in parallel accounts “details and advantages” of more certified ideas. It is if not a ground, then a precondition for working out a consolidated determination of government stability as a politological category, operationalization of which let us draw a number of scientific conclusions and predictions. Taking into consideration the fact that the obtained ideas and conclusions must be elaborated, specified and systematized, as it, probably, creates distinct prospects of defining new applied and theoretical knowledge.

Solving the set tasks we first of all appeal to definitions of those notions and categories, which mainly determine the definition and indicators for government stability. In the first instance we refer to interpretation of the terms “government” and “stability”.

We consider “government” on the assumption of the institutional nature of its functioning. One of the ways to express the mechanism of state authorities functioning is correlation between powers of political institutions and institutes of political authority. Under the neo-institutionalism political institutions are determined differently, in particular as: the rules of approving political and managerial decisions; rules, regulations and political strategies; formal rules,

<sup>23</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>24</sup> C. Nikolenyi, *Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe*, „Party Politics“ 2004, vol 10, s. 123-150.

<sup>25</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>26</sup> P. van Roosendaal, *Government Survival in Western Multi-Party Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1997, vol 32, s. 71-92.

<sup>27</sup> P. Warwick, *The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1979, vol 11, s. 465-498.

<sup>28</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science“ 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180-203.

<sup>29</sup> J. Druckman, *Party Factionalism and Cabinet Durability*, „Party Politics“ 1996, vol 3, s. 397-407.

<sup>30</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.

<sup>31</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 64, s. 28-37.

<sup>32</sup> J. Toole, *Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe*, „Party Politics“ 2000, vol 6, s. 441-461.

<sup>33</sup> K. Strom, *Contending Models of Cabinet Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 82, s. 923-941.

<sup>34</sup> J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 2002, vol 46, s. 760-771.

<sup>35</sup> G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.

<sup>36</sup> G. Luebbert, *A Theory of Government Formation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 229-264.

<sup>37</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>38</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniakhnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.

procedures of achieving political consent and practices, which structuralize relations between subjects; collective actions concerning managing and extension of the field of individual actions, which make up a political system. According to the neo-institutional methodology we may state that institutes are a set of formal rules, as well as informal restrictions and mechanisms of their forced actualization; frames of organizations and regularities, where political actors influence the results of political processes. That is why political institutes and establishments serve for taking compulsory decisions and their actualization in practice. Concerning this G. Gohler assumes that when they are longstanding, then they are applied to perform positive influence on a political structure and social matter<sup>39</sup>.

Controversial is a question concerning specific definition of current political institutes. Their narrow definition merely touches formal establishments, formed in accordance with the law, and on the contrary their broad definition presupposes unofficial institutes, which may develop in correlation between individual and collective actors. As to the latter W. Merkel and A. Croissant state that political values and practice must be considered as those which have unofficially determined character<sup>40</sup>. Leading function of institutes, according to D. North<sup>41</sup>, lies in providing stability due to smoothing changes in correlation with the rules of the game. Within this context we apply a scientific position, due to which political institutes "are connected" with formal principles, structures, functions, positions towards other institutes. For instance, G. Lanzara emphasizes that any political institute is a result of the process, where the structure/system of interdependencies and criteria for stabilization and legitimation of a political institute is formed<sup>42</sup>. Role of any separate institute or a class of institutes (prime-minister, government, president etc.) can be comprehended only under condition when it (they) exists in the midst of the whole political system. In his turn, P. Patnam mentions, that evaluation of institutes requires analysis of their actions in a diversified social, economic, political environment. Thus, the most important thing is that the regularity of social-political and state-legal development of all countries in the world is a concentration of leading powers by the institutes of the executive branch.

The government represents the apex of the executive system. Its reference of work may be reduced to implementation of laws and exercising tasks in the sphere of management. The government (predominantly and traditionally) is in possession of executive political power, which is probably the most significant in the country. Moreover, the government is a collegiate body of executive power of general competency, it manages the country; it is the apex of a multistage pyramid in the system of executive power, which includes regional, local bodies/agencies etc. it

<sup>39</sup> G. Gohler, *Einleitung*, [w:] G. Gohler (ed.), *Grundfragen der Theorie politischer Institutionen: Forschungsstand, Probleme, Perspektiven*, Wyd. Westdeutscher Verlag 1987, s. 7-14.

<sup>40</sup> W. Merkel, Croissant A., *Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien*, „Politische Vierteljahresschrift“ 2000, vol 41, nr 1, s. 18.

<sup>41</sup> D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 3.

<sup>42</sup> G. Lanzara, *Self-Destructive Processes in Institution Building and Some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1998, vol 33, nr 1, s. 1.

is not a narrowly specialized regulatory body, but a body of general competence, which manages state executive structures in all spheres of social life.

Political and legal status of the government is specified by the constitution or a special law. The role of the government and ways of its formation/powers depend on the provided form and system of state governance, historical peculiarities of the country. For instance, in classical presidential republics the executive branch is headed by the president, which is perceived as its embodiment and a direct bearer. "Government" categories are not singled out here, but such terms as the "executive power" or "presidential administration" are used. In countries with parliamentary and in many republics with a mixed form/system of government (predominantly under a mixed constitutional form of the government scientists mean a semi-presidential system) the president does not belong or partially belongs to the structure of the executive power. Their powers and authorities are presupposed by the status of the head of the country. However, the president's competence includes separate responsibilities in the sphere of the executive power, most of which may be implemented only through the government. That is why, the interrelations between the head of the state and that of the government are usually determined as a model of "dualism of the executive power"<sup>43</sup>. On this basis, it becomes clear that the government's activity and its stability are first of all presupposed by the construction of political power, which exists in one country or another.

Regarding this, it is difficult to present a universal definition of the government. M. Laver and K. Shepsle mention: "If we consider formation of any government we will face confusion, connected with activity of a large pool of politicians, officials, lobbyists, interested groups, electorate and analysts. Namely this approach makes every single government profoundly distinctive from another one"<sup>44</sup>. In this context the government is linked to the results of the parliamentary elections and parliament's activity. According to D. Baron<sup>45</sup> the notion "government" is used to appeal to the parties, which do not speak against a vote of confidence on their political grounds. M. Matilla and T. Raunio mark that the results of the elections determine the "starting" point as to a new government formation: almost in all cases they are an outcome of the elections and are partially independent of these results<sup>46</sup>. M. Laver and K. Shepsle underline that one should distinguish the government as an "independent institute" and an "institute of political actors, who are represented in the parliament and ensure its support during voting"<sup>47</sup>. In general it means that it is reasonable to study the notion of the government within the

<sup>43</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... k.and. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 58.

<sup>44</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 5.

<sup>45</sup> D. Baron, *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems*, „American Political Science Review“ 1991, vol 85, nr: 1, s. 157.

<sup>46</sup> M. Matilla, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, „European journal of political research“ 2004, vol 43, nr. 2, s. 264.

<sup>47</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 264.

parliamentary and mixed form/system of governance, where the executive power is exercised by both the president and the government, as the governmental institutes within the presidential form/system of governance has their own significant peculiarities.

At the same time, it is quite notable that in political science such definitions as the government, governmental cabinet and cabinet of ministers are simultaneously used to determine a political body of executive powers (from the perspective of evaluating parliamentary and semi-presidential systems). The government is an institute which carries out administration throughout the country or over a part of it. The governmental cabinet is a form of the government, where the prime-minister or the president forms the cabinet of ministers, committing its members to take charge of the corresponding ministries. The cabinet of ministers is a committee, formed out of the most significant members of the government, including the prime-minister (president) and ministers<sup>48</sup>. M. Gallaher, M. Laver and P. Mair interpret the government as a “totality of main political figures, formally appointed by the head of the state, but in fact chosen by the prime-minister after consultations with the governmental parties”<sup>49</sup>. However, if we take into consideration apolitical activists and formation of non-party governments it is necessary to focus on the need to carry out consultations with parties or the need to find support for the government in the parliament. That is why we agree with V. Lytvyn’s definition, according to which the “government” is a “fixed composition of politicians and professionals, formally appointed by the head of the state, but in fact chosen by the prime-minister, who have a right to take political decisions concerning all questions within the competence of the government according to the constitution of the country”<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, we support the remark that from the comparative-politological perspective analysis of the government in its wide sense is full of various interpretations, and thus is quite problematic. The government is a “political institute, which includes the cabinet of ministers and service/maintenance staff”. However, it is necessary to apply a narrower, constitutionally presupposed, understanding of the cabinet of ministers.

Next category, which requires specification, is “stability”, in particular “governmental stability”. There are a lot of interpretations of the content and essence of the notion, which political science borrowed from natural sciences, where “stability” means a fixed state, characterized by the ability to continual existence and preservation in time. Besides, the term has a group of analogues in other disciplines. Nevertheless, we appeal to the interpretation of stability as to the ability of a system to keep parameters within certain boundaries, oppose outbreaks and return to the balanced state in case of deviations. Semantically, stability borders the notions of firmness, balance, steadiness and variability.

Therefore, political process is determined through this understanding of stability. However, the notion of “political stability” is not absolutely précised. On the basis of a general scientific

<sup>48</sup> P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998, s. 128.

<sup>49</sup> M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

<sup>50</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv kraïn Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukraïny: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 33.

comprehension of stability, we propose to determine its political component as a characteristic or a state of “political life” of the society, which reveals in stable functioning of all political institutes, in adherence to legal, political and moral regulations/traditions, in peaceful solution of conflict situations, which let the system function effectively, develop and preserve its structure and qualitative determination. Taking into account this definition we may trace the connection between stability and effectiveness, which must be actualized on the basis of an asserted requirement concerning evaluation of governmental stability. We keep in mind such aspects of political stability as: 1) systematical (regularities/tendencies of an integral development of the political system, institutes and processes); 2) functional (programs of actors in the political process (political actors) with possible and real results of their activity); 3) cognitive (a political actor must possess up-to-date and full information concerning political institutes, phenomena and processes).

V. Lytvyn mentions that on the basis of this construction it is quite clear that stability of governments is an abstract notion<sup>51</sup>, because it can refer to various significant moments in governments’ activity in different ways. It becomes especially urgent in the context of a widespread interpretation of stability as “functioning of one government” over the extended period of time. Along with that, of great importance is understanding of political stability as a balance of forces, which determine governments’ activity<sup>52</sup>. Taking into account these determined categories it is obvious that there is a need to define stability of governments as the ability of the cabinet of ministers, in case of falling out of the balanced state of the political system, to return to this state (keeping in mind two parameters: internal – imbalance on the basis of contradictions within the government; external – governmental stability is under the influence of institutional and constitutional peculiarities of a political system, political context and political environment); as the ability of the cabinet of ministers to react to the changes in the political environment (political disturbances or accidental obstacles, political crises) and preserve almost the same configuration and behavior throughout a long period of time<sup>53</sup>. On the basis of studying specifying notions we support the conclusion, provided by the Ukrainian scholar, that stability of governments in its wide sense is the ability of the government to be in office and perform its duties: while in a narrow sense it means a stable state of government’s functioning, which is characterized by the capacity for a continuous existence, preservation of fundamental internal and external parameters.

However, one should keep in mind other definitions of the governmental stability, such as: situational and operational parameters of dynamics in the government’s activity and the

<sup>51</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 33.

<sup>52</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Konseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist”*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seria: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia” 2008, vol 10, s. 37-42.; V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist: teoretyko-metodolohichni zasady doslidzhennia*, „Ukrainska natsionalna ideia: realii ta perspektyvy rozvytku” 2009, vol 21, s. 117-121.

<sup>53</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 34.

results of agreements between the major political forces; absence of crisis, preconditioned by the change of governments; distinctive properties of changes under a modifying influence of political will, aimed at slowdown (or stimulation) of changes and destabilization (or stabilization) of the governmental cabinets; ability of the cabinet to self-preservation under conditions which threaten its existence; forms of "legitimization of an executive hierarchy"; the outcomes of peculiarities of power-executive relations which influence the quality of governance; a stable layer of interrelations between the executive and legislation branches (when the government solves crises and by means of successful institutionalization of new patterns of integration and resource partition); an ability of the government to remain in office after various dramatic changes in the political environment; a consent, which ensures the existence of a stable political regime.

From this perspective an additional moment and attribute for evaluation of the stability of governments must be determination of political systems as democratic or non-democratic. The point is that in democratic countries one type of initial conditions has been elaborated (mainly party-electoral determinants are in the focus), which especially influence the process of evaluation of governmental stability. While in non-democratic countries it is impossible to speak of analogical nature of initially elaborated influences, as other mechanisms of development of relations in this context, which evaluate governmental stability, have been institutionalized there. That is why, taking into account such peculiarities of factors, which predetermine functioning of the cabinets of ministers, we suggest applying two directions of interpretation for the stability of governments: contextual and institutional. Under the first one the analysis of mechanisms of changes is focused on achieving/violation of balance between the cabinet and its outer context (J. Linz<sup>54</sup>, R. Dahl<sup>55</sup>, J. Blondel<sup>56</sup> and others). In the second one we may trace a kind of connection between governmental stability and formal regulations/practices, as well as informal procedures and rules of the game (J. March<sup>57</sup>, D. Olsen and P. Norton<sup>58</sup>, D. North<sup>59</sup>, R. Putnam<sup>60</sup>, S. Huntington<sup>61</sup> and others). In the late 1980s – early 1990s was formed a third (cross-disciplinary) approach towards analysis of the stability of governments, in particular on the basis of the management theory as a determinant of the government's ability to ensure stable and effective political process (M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle<sup>62</sup>, L. Frischtak<sup>63</sup>, G. Hidden<sup>64</sup>, A.

<sup>54</sup> J. Linz, *Democracy's Time Constraint*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 19-37.

<sup>55</sup> R. Dahl, *The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems*, „Public Administration Review“ 1947, vol 7, nr. 1, s. 1-11.

<sup>56</sup> J. Blondel, F. Muller-Rommel, *Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>57</sup> J. March, J. Olsen, *The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life*, „American Political Science Review“ 1984, vol 78, s. 734-749.

<sup>58</sup> D. Olson, P. Norton, *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1996.

<sup>59</sup> D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>60</sup> R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work*, Wyd. Greenwood Publishing Group 2002.

<sup>61</sup> S. Huntington, *Will more Countries Become Democratic?*, „Political Science Quarterly“ 1984, vol 99, s. 193-218.

<sup>62</sup> M. Bratton, N. Van de Walle, *Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses*, [w:] G. Hyden, M. Bratton (eds.), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Wyd. Rienner 1992.

<sup>63</sup> L. Frischtak, *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*, „World Bank Technical Paper“ 1994, vol 254.

<sup>64</sup> I. Indridason, C. Kam, *Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 621-656.



Korotayev<sup>65</sup>, W. Swatos<sup>66</sup> and others). Relating to this it becomes clear that the stability of the government must presuppose effectiveness or ineffectiveness of governments (and in general the whole process of state development, as the government is in charge of the internal and external policy) in certain democratic or non-democratic parameters of environment.

B. Powell<sup>67</sup> and P. Schmitter<sup>68</sup> validate the scientific position that institutional conditionality of the governmental stability presupposes analysis of influence made by the participants of the political process, who take part in functioning of governmental cabinets. J. Linz<sup>69</sup> mentions that there must be variability within the frames of governments, as the electorate share the desire of continuousness and stability of governments and readiness to conditions of influence caused by a great number of variables in the governmental activity. It means that the indicator for the governmental stability are formalized measures, presupposed by the law, as well as formal and informal political institutes (president, parties, elections etc.), which may impact the governmental cabinets.

In this context it is rather significant to differentiate indicators for the governmental stability due to various ways of government formation. The stability of governments under their parliamentary way of formation is outlined by "termination" of the cabinet within its legislative terms (term limit of the parliament). In his turn, L. Dodd defines disorders or shifts in a single-party or coalitional government as a rotation during a division of cabinet posts between the parties and as changes in division of posts<sup>70</sup>. It means that the indicator for the stability of governments is a party composition of governments. Governmental stability in cases of a presidential (or non-parliamentary) way of the cabinet formation faces understanding of termination of the cabinet within the terms of the head of the state. In this context a party composition of governmental cabinets is not always an indicator, which can give an answer to the question concerning division of ministerial posts (however, even in such systems, though not always, it is necessary to get an agreement from the legislative body as to the governmental cabinet formation). In any case designation of party determinants' influence in the processes of governments' formation and resignation has a principal value. It is not always fundamental, as often institutionalized practices, which allow, in fact, forming governmental cabinets without the legislative power's consent. Besides, in some countries prevail (in quantity) non-party cabinets, which must be taken into account as well.

Despite this, party determinants of the government formation must be taken into consideration. First of all, it is clear that the governmental stability is determined by the size and

<sup>65</sup> A. Korotayev, A. Malkov, D. Khaltourina, *Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: secular cycles and millennial trends*, Wyd. URSS 2006.

<sup>66</sup> W. Swatos, *Time, Place, and Circumstance: Neo-Weberian Studies in Comparative Religious History*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1990.

<sup>67</sup> B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

<sup>68</sup> P. Schmitter, J. Santiso, *Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 69-92.

<sup>69</sup> J. Linz, *Democracy's Time Constraint*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 19-37.

<sup>70</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

complexity of party systems. It can be followed on the basis of ideas by J. Blondel<sup>71</sup> (duration of single-party cabinets), D. Sanders, V. Herman<sup>72</sup> and P. Warwick<sup>73</sup> (influence of factionalization, types ideological spectrum of party systems on the stability of governments). Secondly, it is obvious that the governmental activity is almost always presupposed by the fact of simple support/non-support of the cabinets by key political (exogenous) actors, among which the most significant role is played by parties. W. Riker<sup>74</sup> and A. Swaan<sup>75</sup> single out several party variables of the governmental stability: power and activity of parties within the government (governmental parties); ideological positions of the parties; patterns and peculiarities of coalitional and non-coalitional, as well as party and non-party processes in different countries (they presuppose formation of non-party and party governments, among the latter are coalitional and single-party ones etc.).

Special attention must be paid to correlation of institutional features within the executive-legislative relationships and the stability of governments. It is derivative from the patterns and attributes of positioning statuses/roles of governments, presidents, parliaments<sup>76</sup> and turns around presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems of governance, in particular while dividing and combining cabinets' powers. It presupposes comprehension of executive and legislative relations as a starting point for analysis of the governmental stability. Its significance can be explained by the fact that the post of the prime-minister is inherent to almost all countries (except traditional presidential republics and absolute monarchies) and ministers (in different quantity) depending on the parliamentary confidence. Moreover, most frequently namely the parliament is authorized to express a vote of non-confidence to governments (or some ministers)<sup>77</sup>. From this perspective, when we speak of parliamentary and presidential ways of government formation in the context of evaluating their stability it is necessary to apply such indices of the latter as formation of the government, vote of non-confidence to the government, resignation of the government, dissolution of the parliament<sup>78</sup>.

Besides, there exist other indicators for the stability of governments. B. Grofman and P. Roosendaal place them within the frames of such correlation<sup>79</sup>: power of parties in the parliament – attributes of party balance in the governmental cabinets; ideological positioning

<sup>71</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science“ 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180-203.

<sup>72</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.

<sup>73</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>74</sup> W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

<sup>75</sup> A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>76</sup> L. DeWinter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] Doring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115-151.

<sup>77</sup> H. Doring, *Is Government Control of the Agenda Likely to Keep 'Legislative Inflation' at Bay?*, [w:] H. Doring (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 654-687.; Olson D., Norton P., *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1996.

<sup>78</sup> M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

<sup>79</sup> B. Grofman, P. van Roosendaal, *Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.

– inter-party competitiveness – composition of the governmental cabinets; constitutional/institutional characteristics of the political process – executive-legislative relations – composition of cabinets; internal context – parliaments and governments; anticipated consequences of dissolution of governments – stability of governments. E. Zimmerman proposes an analogous scheme of research perspectives of the governmental stability: the stability of the government depends on party attributes of the cabinet and parliament, type of the government, characteristics of governmental and oppositional parties, and conditions for government formation<sup>80</sup>.

At the same time, analysis tools for studying the stability of governments would not be full only on the basis of constructing its indicators. It is also necessary to operate the units of evaluation. Due to this a logical theoretical and methodological abstraction of the governmental stability is reduced to a practical and empirical specificity of certain cases, outlined in time. It serves a ground for drawing a conclusion that the stability of governments is a model of analysis, which combines in it ideal and logical, as well as practical and factual characteristics of governmental cabinets' functioning in various countries.

From this perspective it becomes clear, that cabinets of ministers subsequent to the results of their activity "output" various quantitative data, but they (the data) are directly comparable with the parameters and peculiarities of different countries. The most comprehensible among the tools, which determine the governmental stability, is the government duration (duration of governments). However, M. Laver proves that there are divergences in determining the governmental duration through such notions as the cabinet duration and cabinet durability. The former means the time between the "start" and "end" of the government's existence; the latter defines a potential duration of governments on the basis of the influence carried out by the model of governments' formation (either presidential or parliamentary). I. Budge<sup>81</sup> and H. Klingemann<sup>82</sup> consider duration of governments, their party composition and division of posts to be the most significant features of governments. B. Grofman, P. Roosendaal<sup>83</sup> and K. Zorn<sup>84</sup> believe such combination to be not an accidental one, as every cabinet is important as a model of development or approbation of new theoretical and practical models, including political and legislative ones. P. Warwick took a step further, trying to prove the hypothesis, that the government duration is an absolute indicator for stability of modern political regimes (first of all democracies)<sup>85</sup>.

<sup>80</sup> E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

<sup>81</sup> I. Budge, H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>82</sup> H.-D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *Parties, Policies and Democracy*, Wyd. Westview Press 1994.

<sup>83</sup> B. Grofman, P. van Roosendaal, *Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.

<sup>84</sup> C. Zorn, S. Van Winkle, *A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992*, „Political Behavior“ 2000, vol 22, s. 145-166.

<sup>85</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

Moreover, it is important to estimate and analyze not only generalized key figures of the cabinet duration, but also mechanisms of their explanation. Here, the fundamental importance belongs to the way of formation and support of the governmental cabinet. As it was stated above, it often happens as a result of the parliament's or president's influence on the cabinet duration. Relating to this, A. Lijphart singles out several theoretical and methodological issues: is it necessary to count "supporting parties" as governmental parties (as the latter influence formation of ideas as to a probable preterm termination of the government's activity); is there a requirement to change some members of the cabinet of ministers (for example, the prime-minister or several ministers) to terminate their activity<sup>86</sup>. However, the most important question concerns the way which cabinet must be determined as that which terminated its activity. The most frequent grounds for termination of the government's activity is division of ministerial posts, renewal of the cabinet after haggling over the posts (recurrent naming of the cabinet by the president/prime-minister under conditions of forming non-party and single-party governments). Moreover, activity of the governmental cabinet is believed to be terminated, when the parliamentary/presidential elections (depending on the model of government formation) are to take place and thus there is a necessity to form a new cabinet. In such a case there is no sense whether the formation of the government leads to a renewal of its previous composition. As a result, there appears a significant question concerning stages and approaches, according to which one should differentiate between the type of the governments: formed after the elections and temporary ones; dissolved due to death (illness) of the prime-ministers or pre-term elections; dissolved on the basis of the president's order or on the basis of reformatting of the composition of the parliamentary majority (or minority).

From the perspective of the cabinet duration these governments coincide with the cases when the cabinets of ministers come into office and when their powers end that is with a fixed time terms of governments' activity. "Starting point" for the government means any cabinet formed after the elections and resignation of the previous government. The government always resigns, when new elections are held (parliamentary or presidential), depending on the model of government formation) or on the basis of the president's order or other constitutional preconditions (concerning all models of government formation). Following the ideas proposed by K. Beyme<sup>87</sup>, J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge<sup>88</sup>, it should be mentioned that the governmental cabinets' activity may be ended due to such events: legislative restrictions, which cause frequency of parliamentary or presidential elections; death or illness of the prime-minister; vote of non-confidence to the cabinet (or the prime-minister); breakdown of the governmental coalition, caused by inner divergences of the government's political course;

<sup>86</sup> A. Lijphart, *Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.

<sup>87</sup> K. von Beyme, E. Martin, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Gower 1985.

<sup>88</sup> J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Political Data 1945-1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1998, vol 33, s. 125-164.

willful resignation of the cabinet; conflicts between the cabinet of ministers (the prime-minister) and the head of the state.

Besides, it is necessary to single out two groups of termination of powers of the governments: 1) technical (scheduled elections of the president or parliament (depending on the type of the system) accidents); 2) discretionary (pre-term elections of the initial actor of governmental formation/resignation, willful extension of the government by means of engaging the parties, which were not formerly present in it; change of a significant part of ministers and the structure of the cabinet within the non-party governments; resignation of the prime-minister, caused by the vote of non-confidence in the parliament or on the basis of the president's order, resignation of the prime-minister due to the conflicts between the governmental parties, resignation of the prime-minister due to conflicts between the governmental parties and personal motives)<sup>89</sup>. Determination of time definition (and namely time is considered to be an indicator for the government duration) within the governments' activity is estimated in the same way, close to the people's will (only the source of legitimacy of governments is changing: in case of a parliamentary way of government formation legitimacy is embodied in the positions of the president and parliament; and in the sense of the presidential way of government formation legitimacy depends on the elections of the head of the state) and allows taking into account parliamentary characteristics (especially the role of the parliamentary opposition)<sup>90</sup>.

At the same time, there are different measurement units of the governmental stability and duration. The most apparent are days, months and year. However, according to D. Sanders and V. Herman, they are not always effective as elective terms of various parliaments or presidents in different countries mainly correlate (the country with "shorter terms" of parliamentary/presidential powers and authorities immanently lead to lesser stability of the government). That is why, additional instruments of measuring the stability of governments are: "survival of the government" – is a maximum period of time, over which the government can perform its duties; indicators for general instability of governments – is an annual average number of terminated governments, which is observed in-between the elections; indicators for biased instability of governments – is an annual average number of alterations within the composition of the government. J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge emphasize that the duration of the government is represented in days, months and years, while the survival of the government is described by a correlation between the duration and a maximum period of time in office (cabinet durability)<sup>91</sup>. Supplementary, to explain the survival of the government one should take into account differences in constitutional characteristics of governmental resignations. Among them M. Laver and N. Schofield single out the following: accession to the post (investiture in case of

<sup>89</sup> E. Damgaard, *Cabinet Termination*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Muller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Style in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 303-304.

<sup>90</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 353.

<sup>91</sup> J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Political Data 1945-1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1998, vol 33, s. 125-164.

formal voting for approval of a presidential nominee in the presidential or parliamentary model of government formation); governmental authority (under condition that the government may dissolve a legislative body); parliamentary authority (becomes significant when the parliament may dissolve itself)<sup>92</sup>. This list we elaborate with a president's possibility to choose between the cabinet resignation (by means of vote of non-confidence) and the parliament dissolution. Such scientific specificity presupposes usage of such instrument of the government's stability analysis as the index of the governmental stability. This is an indicator that shows which part of the most possible period of time – terms of the parliament/president in accordance with the constitution – the governmental cabinet was functioning<sup>93</sup>.

Summarizing all the instruments for measuring the stability of the governments we argue that it must be implemented in terms of comparing indices of the governmental duration and governmental stability. It will to the fullest extent represent the issues under study and will include a comparative political science equality, entirety and scientific character as well.

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<sup>92</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>93</sup> J.-E. Lane, S. Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, Wyd. SAGE 1999, s. 304.

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